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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal judges are statutorily disqualified from hearing cases 
whenever their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”1 Although 
this provision was codified nearly a half-century ago, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that the underlying interest it protects is a fundamental part 
of constitutional due process.2 “Justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice,” the Court has written, and as a result “[t]he Due Process Clause 
may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would 
do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between 
contending parties.”3 
The appearance-based disqualification statute plays two important 
roles. First, it promotes confidence in the judiciary—people can trust that 
judges will apply the law impartially. Second, it applies even when a judge 
fails to recognize his or her own partiality, offering a protective buffer in 
situations where the risk of such partiality is excessively high. 
When litigants seek disqualification of a federal district court judge 
based on an appearance of partiality, however, the challenged judge 
personally rules on the disqualification motion.4 It is not until appeal that 
a neutral third party weighs in on the reasonableness of the challenge to 
the judge’s impartiality.5 Because trial-court procedure leaves it to the 
trial judge to decide whether he or she “is or appears to be biased,” then-
Professor (now Judge) Karen Nelson Moore wrote three decades ago that 
“swift review is essential to ensure impartiality.”6 
Such swift review is especially important during a time of political 
discord. Growing partisan division among the public and a heightened 
emphasis on judicial appointments in the political process have created a 
situation where individuals view judges through the lens of partisan 
affiliation.7 Senator McConnell recently gave a speech in which he talked 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012). 
2. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
3. Id. 
4. RICHARD E. FLAMM, RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES: FOR CAUSE MOTIONS,
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND APPEALS 775–76 (2018) (explaining that “the vast majority of 
judges” have concluded a § 455 motion “must be filed with the challenged judge herself; and that 
such judge may or even should be the one to rule on it,” and that “many federal courts” have concluded 
that there is “an affirmative duty to do so.”). 
5. The procedures in the states offer much greater variation. Id. 
6. Karen Nelson Moore, Appellate Review of Judicial Disqualification Decisions in the
Federal Courts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 853 (1984). 
7. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. 
739, 739 (2018) (“Hardening partisan identities mean that there is less middle ground on political 
issues and less cooperation among those with differing political views. As a result, the public 
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of how “we” had “flipped” several circuits and planned to flip more.8 His 
political opponents took an opposite, though equally politicized view, 
arguing that McConnell had “stolen” a Supreme Court seat by delaying 
Senate action on a judicial nomination until after a presidential election 
and change in administration.9 Partisan rancor heightens distrust of the 
judiciary. 
Appellate review stands out as one of the primary tools capable of 
counteracting distrust in the judiciary, whether that distrust arises from 
partisan politics or from other sources.10 Appellate review offers 
disappointed litigants a chance to be heard. Even when litigants lose on 
appeal, the very process of being able to present their complaints to a 
higher forum “promotes a sense of procedural fairness and leaves people 
feeling better about the outcome.”11 
The appellate process therefore plays an important role in 
safeguarding the appearance of justice. The disqualification statute, 
however, is silent on appellate procedure. As a result, various splits have 
emerged, creating inconsistencies in the review of disqualification for 
apparent partiality.12 Reconciling these procedures is important to protect 
the benefits of appellate review—that is, to ensure that individuals receive 
fair treatment and an equal opportunity to be heard in the litigation 
process. 
This article examines the appellate procedures employed in the 
review of judicial disqualification and recommends mechanisms to 
standardize appellate review. After this introduction, Part II offers 
background explaining the constitutional basis and statutory provisions 
governing judicial disqualification and explores various situations that can 
give rise to recurring challenges over the appearance of impartiality. Part 
III examines the different mechanisms by which parties can appeal 
appearance-based disqualification, including appellate review after final 
increasingly scrutinizes judges and judicial candidates for signs of political agreement, distrusting 
those perceived to support the opposing political party.”). 
8. Professor Josh Blackman attended the speech and reported that Senator McConnell stated, 
“We have flipped the 2nd Circuit, the 3rd Circuit, and we will flip the 11th circuit.” 
@JoshMBlackman, TWITTER (Nov. 13, 2019, 8:08 PM), https://twitter.com/joshmblackman/
status/1195146526890299392?lang=en [https://perma.cc/CW4U-SH2X]. Professor Blackman also 
shared a brief video of the speech. Id. 
9. Editorial, The Stolen Supreme Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2016. 
10. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1274 (2013)
(explaining that the right to appeal “protects a litigant’s dignity by diffusing the power of an individual 
judge—a diffusion that is especially important in an era where the power of the trial judge is larger 
than ever before.”). 
11. Id. 
12. See infra Parts III and IV.
3
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judgment, mandamus review, discretionary appeals, and collateral-order 
appeals. Part IV delves deeper into the areas of circuit disagreement, 
examining the standard of review, the review of a trial judge’s decision to 
recuse, review of cases in which the parties failed to raise disqualification 
issues with the trial court, and the applicability of the harmless-error 
doctrine. Ultimately, the article recommends that the federal courts 
standardize appellate review of disqualification orders to minimize 
confusion and promote confidence in an impartial judiciary. 
II. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION IN FEDERAL COURT
Federal disqualification standards provide broad grounds for recusal 
with limited mechanisms for enforcement. The broadest of the 
disqualification standards requires federal judges to disqualify themselves 
whenever their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”13 The 
statute is intended to protect the appearance of justice by “establish[ing] 
an objective standard that operates regardless of actual bias” in cases 
where there is “some reasonable basis for alleging bias.”14 
Although the standard calls for objectivity, it provides little help in 
achieving objective application of the statute, most notably because a 
challenged judge is required to personally rule on the motion calling their 
impartiality into question. As both courts and scholars have come to 
recognize in recent years, objectivity is in the eye of the beholder—and 
individuals are not good at recognizing their own biases.15 Psychological 
research has shown that people are likely to overattribute bias to other 
parties even as they underestimate their own.16 Judges are not immune to 
the bias blind spot, and they may even have a higher personal stake in a 
self-image of impartiality. As Professor Charles Geyh has explained, 
“[i]nsofar as being impartial is a defining feature of the ‘good’ judge in 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012); Moore, supra note 6, at 832 (“In 1974 Congress substantially
amended the personal involvement provision, 28 U.S.C. § 455, in an attempt to clarify the kind of 
involvement with the matter in controversy that warrants judicial disqualification.”); Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process.’ As the Court has recognized, however, ‘most matters relating to 
judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.’”) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 136 (1955) and FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948)). 
14. Moore, supra note 6, at 832. 
15. Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias 
in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 783 (2004). 
16. Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCI. 37, 41 (2007) (explaining that people may discount their own biases because of 
“unwarranted reliance on their introspections for assessing personal bias,” as well as “their 
assumption that their own perceptions directly reflect ‘objective reality’”). 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/3
2019] JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION ON APPEAL 577 
the ethical dimension, judges who implement disqualification rules in the 
procedural dimension would seem to have a personal interest in the 
outcomes of challenges to their own impartiality.”17 As a result, he 
explains, “many lawyers have long been reluctant to seek disqualification 
of judges, who are unlikely to second-guess their own impartiality and 
who may take umbrage at the suggestion that their impartiality is in 
doubt.”18 
Concerns about the objective review of disqualification standards 
have led many states to experiment with different procedures. Some states 
require a different judge to rule on the disqualification motion, while 
others offer litigants a single peremptory challenge to disqualify a judge 
without the need to make an evidentiary showing.19 Numerous scholars 
have recommended that the federal courts adopt similar procedures.20 At 
the current time, however, the courts have not yet done so. As a result, 
appellate review remains the primary mechanism for objective review of 
a judge’s qualification to sit in a given case. 
A. The History of Judicial Disqualification in Federal Court 
Federal judicial disqualification statutes date back to the founding 
era, with the first adopted in 1792.21 In the ensuing centuries, Congress 
has amended and modified disqualification standards and procedures, 
“enlarging the enumerated grounds for seeking disqualification almost 
17. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 546 
(2013). 
18. Id. 
19. Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably
Be Questioned: Moving Beyond A Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 468 (2014) (“Eighteen 
states provide for the automatic disqualification of a trial court judge upon the timely request of a 
party.”). 
20. James Sample, The Agnostic’s Guide to Judicial Selection, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 243
(2018); Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial 
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification 
Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 238, 303 (2017); 
Melinda A. Marbes, Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating Decisionmaker Bias and Promoting 
Public Confidence, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 807, 849 (2015); Dmitry Bam, Our Unconstitutional Recusal 
Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135, 1194 (2015); Suzanne Levy, Comment, Your Honor, Please Explain: 
Why Congress Can, and Should, Require Justices to Publish Reasons for Their Recusal Decisions, 
16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1194 (2014); Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive 
Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 210 (2011); Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial, 
and the Appearance of Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign 
Contributions on Judges’ Decisions, 26 J. L. & POL. 359, 384 (2011); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why 
Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 731 (2011); Amanda Frost, Keeping 
Up Appearances: A Process Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531 (2005). 
21. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGES 21 (3d. ed. 2017). 
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every time.”22 Originally, the statute focused on cases in which the judge 
possessed a “direct, pecuniary interest in the cause.”23 Later, a new 
provision was added to allow parties to challenge the trial judge’s alleged 
bias against the complainant or in favor of the opposing party.24 The 
grounds for disqualification were enlarged again in 1974, when Congress 
for the first time adopted a provision addressing the appearance of 
impartiality, requiring judges to disqualify themselves whenever their 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”25 
Under the current statutory scheme, these provisions are codified in 
different places. The provision allowing a party to assert “that the judge 
before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either 
against him or in favor of any adverse party,” is now found at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 144. Proceeding under that statute requires the challenging party to
submit a “timely and sufficient affidavit” explaining the “facts and 
reasons” behind the allegation of bias. The remaining grounds for 
disqualification are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 455(b) now 
provides the specific grounds for judges to disqualify themselves even 
without such an affidavit, including situations where the judge “has a 
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party” or “personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts”; where the judge previously served as counsel 
in the case; where the judge’s spouse or other close relative is a party; or 
where the judge has a financial interest (of any amount) in “the subject 
matter in controversy.”26 
The appearance-based standard is found in § 455(a), requiring that 
“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.” While the particular grounds for 
disqualification found in § 455(b) cannot be waived by the parties, the 
standard found in § 455(a) can be waived “provided it is preceded by a 
full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.”27 
When a challenge is brought under either § 455(a) or (b), the 
challenged judge is the one who hears and decides the motion for 
disqualification. A number of scholars have suggested that it would be 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2012). 
27. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012). 
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preferable for a different judge to rule on such challenges,28 and some 
states have adopted procedures that allow a different judge to hear similar 
motions. However, the federal courts have not yet adopted broad-based 
rules that would require or even allow a different judge to hear the 
challenge. Therefore, parties challenging a judge’s impartiality must 
weigh the risk both that the motion may be denied and that the allegation 
of perceived bias will cause the judge to feel—even if only 
unconsciously—offended by the allegation.29 
B. The Constitutional Basis of Judicial Disqualification 
Although statutes requiring judicial disqualification date back to the 
founding era, it is only recently that the Supreme Court has articulated the 
constitutional basis for disqualification. The constitutional issue has 
arisen when cases come to the Supreme Court for review from the states—
if the state’s supreme court did not find disqualification required under 
state law, then the only question for the Supreme Court to decide is 
whether the United States Constitution would require it. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has twice held that constitutional 
due process required a state trial judge to disqualify himself. First, in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court addressed a situation where 
one donor had contributed an outsized amount to the campaign of a 
candidate for the West Virginia Supreme Court.30 The Court explained 
that the donor had suffered a $50 million adverse verdict prior to the 
election and that it knew that the election winner would review that 
verdict. With this knowledge, but without any “allegation of a quid pro 
quo agreement,”31 the party donated $2.5 million to a political action 
committee supporting a judicial challenger for a position on the Supreme 
Court of West Virginia and made another $500,000 in independent 
expenditures.32 In total, this money was “more than the amount spent by 
28. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Three Reasons Why the Challenged Judge Should Not Rule
on A Judicial Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 659, 660 (2015); see also authorities 
cited supra note 20. 
29. Judges are expected to keep themselves above the fray. Nonetheless, one practice guide
acknowledges candidly that “some judges resent being challenged on minor matters and may carry 
over their resentment to future cases.” Challenges for Cause, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE CIV. TRIALS & EV. 
Ch. 3-A. See also W. Bradley Wendel, Campaign Contributions and Risk-Avoidance Rules in Judicial 
Ethics, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 255, 280 (2018) (“Well-known psychological tendencies create blind 
spots when someone is asked to evaluate her propensity to engage in wrongdoing. We have a strong 
tendency to view ourselves as competent, ethical, and deserving.”). 
30. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009). 
31. Id. at 871. 
32. Id. at 873. 
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all other . . . supporters.”33 With this financial backing, the challenger 
won, and he refused to recuse himself from the donor’s case when it came 
before his court.34 The Supreme Court held that while not every campaign 
contribution will require a judge to recuse from hearing a case involving 
the donor, this particular one created “a serious, objective risk of actual 
bias.”35 
Less than a decade later, in Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme 
Court again held that disqualification was required as a matter of 
constitutional due process.36 In the Williams case, Ronald Castille had 
served as a Pennsylvania district attorney in the 1980s and approved the 
decision to seek the death penalty against defendant Terrance 
Washington.37 Decades later, Castille served on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court when Washington sought review of a habeas petition 
seeking relief from that death sentence.38 Castille denied a motion to 
disqualify himself, concluding that his efforts on the case as D.A. were 
too limited and too long ago to require recusal.39 The Supreme Court, 
however, concluded that due process required the judge’s disqualification, 
noting “a risk that the judge ‘would be so psychologically wedded’ to his 
or her previous position as a prosecutor that the judge ‘would consciously 
or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed 
position.’”40 
In both Caperton and Williams, the Supreme Court applied a 
constitutional standard significantly narrower than the federal statute 
would require.41 The Court acknowledged that the broader standard 
required by federal statute and by more states requires broad appearance-
based recusal. The constitutional standard, by contrast, encompasses only 
those cases where—even when actual bias cannot be proven—the 
situation is such that it creates “an unacceptable risk of actual bias.”42 
C. Analyzing the Appearance of Impartiality 
Courts addressing disqualification motions based on an appearance 
of bias work within this statutory and constitutional framework. Those 
33. Id.
34. Id. at 874–875. 
35. Id. at 871. 
36. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016). 
37. Id. at 1901–1902. 
38. Id. at 1901. 
39. Id. at 1904. 
40. Id. at 1907. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1908. 
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statutory and constitutional requirements, however, are much easier to 
state than they are to apply. What exactly does it mean to have reasonable 
doubts about a judge’s impartiality? Although each case raises unique 
facts and concerns, there are recurring areas where questions (some of 
them reasonable, some of them less so) arise about a judge’s impartiality. 
1. Failure to Recognize One’s Own Bias
One recurring concern is a judge’s failure to recognize his or her own 
bias. Today, the so-called “bias blind spot” is a staple of legal and 
psychological research.43 But even in earlier eras, there were cases in 
which courts found it reasonable to hold doubts about a judge’s self-
professed neutrality. 
In an espionage case arising against the backdrop of World War I, 
the defendants alleged that “Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis ha[d] a 
personal bias and prejudice against” them based on their German and 
Austrian backgrounds.44 Not only did Judge Landis disagree, but he 
commented from the bench on his perceived lack of such a bias, stating: 
One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against 
the German-Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with 
disloyalty . . . You are of the same mind that practically all the German-
Americans are in this country, and you call yourselves German-
Americans. Your hearts are reeking with disloyalty.45 
Judge Landis may have believed that his strong “judicial mind” 
allowed him to avoid prejudice in the case, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed. A majority of the Court concluded that Landis was disqualified 
for actual prejudice.46 Three justices, on the other hand, dissented, 
suggesting that the defendants had not made a showing that Judge Landis’ 
general feelings about Germans (then a country at war with the United 
States) extended to the defendants personally; they had “disclose[d] no 
adequate ground for believing that personal feeling existed against any 
one of them.”47 The subsequent adoption of § 455(a), however, was 
intended to put that debate to rest by ensuring that statements raising even 
43. Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects
Disqualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 235, 
306 (2013); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). 
44. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921). 
45. Id. at 29. 
46. Id. at 36. 
47. Id. at 42 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
9
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a question about the judge’s ability to be impartial would be sufficient to 
require disqualification.48 
2. Circumstances Create External Pressure
In other cases, there may be nothing in a judge’s words or actions to 
indicate actual bias, but the situation nevertheless puts so much pressure 
on a judge that a reasonable observer would worry that the judge could 
not remain impartial. This type of pressure was cited in both Caperton and 
Williams.49 Even though the judge may be perfectly impartial, the judge 
would be disqualified based on reasonable fears that the judge could be 
susceptible to pressure, whether consciously or unconsciously. 
This type of external pressure was recently cited as a reason not to 
retain a state judge who inadvertently resigned from the bench.50 On April 
1, 2019, just three months after taking the bench as a newly elected district 
judge, Bill McLeod of Harris County, Texas, announced his intent to run 
for the Texas Supreme Court.51 Unfortunately, however, he was unaware 
of a provision in the Texas Constitution stating that “at any time when the 
unexpired term of the office then held shall exceed one year and 30 days, 
such announcement or such candidacy shall constitute an automatic 
resignation of the office then held . . . .”52 McLeod had thus accidentally 
resigned from the position he had held for only three months. 
Another constitutional provision could have saved his job, at least 
temporarily: it allowed the county commissioners to appoint him to 
remain until a successor was appointed. The county commissioners 
declined to retain McLeod, however, based on concerns about the 
appearance of impartiality.53 Under the holdover provision, the county 
commissioners would have the authority to dismiss him at any time. “I 
think voters deserve a judge who can be absolutely independent, as he was 
elected to be,” one of the commissioners reportedly said. “This would put 
us in the untenable position that he would no longer be an unbiased 
person, because he would be beholden to Commissioners Court.”54 
Furthermore, the commissioners noted, McLeod would almost certainly 
48. Moore, supra note 6, at 834 (“[T]he appearance-of-bias test under section 455(a) is easier 
to satisfy than the bias-in-fact test of sections 144 and 455(b)(1).”). 
49. See supra Part II.B.
50. Debra Cassens Weiss, Newly Elected Judge Accidentally Resigns; County Commissioners 
Appoint Replacement, A.B.A. J., April 10, 2019. 
51. Id. 
52. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 65. 
53. Zach Despart, Commissioners Court Appoints Replacement for Harris County Judge Who 
Quit By Mistake, HOUS. CHRON., April 9, 2019. 
54. Id. 
10
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have to recuse himself in any case involving the county—the pressure to 
rule in favor of a party with the power to terminate his job at any time 
would give rise to reasonable questions about the judge’s ability to remain 
impartial.55 
3. Connections and Experience
Finally, judges often have experience or connections that cause 
litigants to raise questions about the judge’s ability to be impartial. Of 
course, the closest of these connections—including situations where the 
judge’s spouse, parents, or children are litigants or parties—requires 
automatic disqualification under § 455(b). Other connections, however, 
can also give rise to questions about the judge’s impartiality. Courts in 
this area have struggled to draw a line between those situations where the 
questions are reasonable enough to require recusal, and those where the 
questions of impartiality are too speculative or too attenuated to meet the 
reasonableness standard. 
Courts have held that a judge’s close, personal friendship with a party 
or an attorney can give rise to questions about a judge’s impartiality, 
though not every close friendship will do so—the question very much 
depends on the overall facts and circumstances.56 The First Circuit 
explained that “when a judge presides in an area where he and his family 
have lived for one or more generations, the numbers of people who have, 
directly or indirectly, helped family members, relatives, close friends, and 
friends of friends would form a large and indeterminate community.”57 
Requiring disqualification on a tenuous basis or for a speculative reason 
based on these connections would “severely constrict” the judge’s role 
and “would reflect a more jaundiced view as to when there should be a 
reasonable doubt about a judge’s impartiality than accords with the public 
perception.”58 
In other cases, political views may exist alongside connections. A 
federal judge on the Sixth Circuit denied a disqualification motion based 
on her husband’s service in the Ohio state legislature.59 The case required 
her to rule on the constitutionality of a statute where her husband was one 
of six co-sponsors, but was neither the author of the bill nor a party to the 
55. Id. 
56. FLAMM, supra note 21, at 491–93. 
57. In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 697 (1st Cir. 1981). 
58. Id. 
59. Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 808 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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subsequent lawsuit.60 The disqualification motion relied on two 
inferences—first, that the judge’s husband would feel a “stake in the 
measure,” and second, that the judge’s personal relationship to her 
husband would cause a reasonable observer to believe that she might favor 
the government in an effort to protect her husband’s reputation.61 Both of 
these asserted interests were ruled too attenuated to support appearance-
based disqualification. 
Courts have recognized that even though § 455(a) provides a very 
broad standard, it is important to establish a baseline of reasonableness for 
such challenges. Allowing disqualification too easily even for 
unreasonably attenuated fears or suspicions can backfire, allowing parties 
to manipulate the system and encouraging the very type of suspicion and 
distrust that the statute is attempting to avoid.62 As a result, courts are 
especially resistant to the idea that judges should recuse based on the 
parties’ own prejudices. Thus, for example, “a well-founded 
disqualification motion will rarely be predicated on a judge’s race or 
ethnicity”63 or on a judge’s gender, sexual orientation or disability.64 
Instead, courts recognize that “a federal judge has an affirmative 
obligation, both to her fellow judges and to the parties in the case, not to 
recuse herself freely, lightly, or unnecessarily, when valid grounds have 
not been raised.”65 
60. Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, Case No. 15-4270 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2015)
(Batchelder, J., denying appellants’ motion to disqualify). 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., In re Allied–Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[W]hen considering 
disqualification, the district court is not to use the standard of ‘Caesar’s wife,’ the standard of mere 
suspicion. That is because the disqualification decision must reflect not only the need to secure public 
confidence through proceedings that appear impartial, but also the need to prevent parties from too 
easily obtaining the disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for 
strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking.”). 
63. FLAMM, supra note 4, at 542; MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 157 F.3d 956,
963 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is intolerable for a litigant, without any factual basis, to suggest that a judge 
cannot be impartial because of his or her race and political background.”). 
64. See Charles Malarkey, Note, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation Cause in
California?, 41 HASTINGS L.J 695, 725 (1990) (“[T]he same considerations that lead one to conclude 
that a judge’s race, sex, ethnicity, or religion is not a sufficient basis, in itself, to infer bias, apply with 
equal validity to a judge’s sexual orientation.”); Thorpe v. Zimmer, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 492, 494 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Zimmer has failed to show that my two knee replacement surgeries have any 
relationship to the evidentiary facts at issue in this case, and I fail to see how an objective person 
could reasonably question my impartiality simply because I have two prosthetic knees.”). 
65. FLAMM, supra note 4, at 830–31. 
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III. VEHICLES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
How should appellate courts review judicial disqualification 
decisions involving the appearance of partiality? The disqualification 
statute does not address appellate review. The primary mechanism for 
review of most issues, of course, is an appeal after final judgment.66 In 
recent decades, courts have been increasingly willing to review the denial 
of disqualification motions earlier. However, this shift has occurred on an 
ad hoc basis, and the federal courts do not always agree on the appropriate 
timing or vehicle for review.67 
A. Review after Final Judgment 
Ordinarily, error in trial proceedings is assessed only after final 
judgment, allowing the aggrieved litigant at trial to take a single appeal.68 
This final-judgment rule allows appellate courts to avoid ruling on matters 
that become moot through the course of litigation, protects the 
independence of trial judges from needless intrusion, and avoids the 
expense and delay that would be caused by piecemeal appeals.69 
Delaying appellate review until after trial-court proceedings have 
terminated can also carry significant disadvantages, however. These 
disadvantages are particularly prominent in the review of judicial 
disqualification motions. Whether or not the judge decides to recuse, a 
disqualification decision does not terminate the case—the merits of the 
case remain to be decided. Waiting until after final judgment to determine 
whether disqualification was proper therefore risks a substantial waste of 
court resources if disqualification was required. The amount of wasted 
time and effort may be substantial. After all, disqualification motions are 
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 
62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 356–58 (2010) (explaining the historical development of the final-judgment 
rule). 
67. At least part of the confusion stems from an underlying lack of cohesion in appellate
review—especially interlocutory review. For a deeper analysis of the issues involved on appeal, see 
generally Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. 
L. REV. 1809, 1852 (2018); Bryan Lammon, Cumulative Finality, 52 GA. L. REV. 767 (2018); Bryan 
Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing Approach and the Inescapable 
Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 371 (2017). The recommendations 
put forth by Professor Lammon in this volume would also substantially simplify and standardize the 
interlocutory review of judicial disqualification orders. See generally Bryan Lammon, Three Ideas 
for Discretionary Appeals, 53 AKRON L. REV. 639 (2020). 
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from 
all final decisions of the district courts . . . .”). 
69. John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence
with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 203 (1994). 
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typically filed early in the litigation when the judge is first assigned to the 
case. Federal-court litigation, however, may continue for months or even 
years.70 
Distinguishing the underlying basis of the recusal motion may offer 
guidance on timing. Motions based on the appearance of partiality 
generally refer to the judge’s pre-existing experience and connections 
with the subject matter, the parties, or the attorneys. These matters are 
knowable before trial and are primarily based on contested interpretations, 
not on contested facts. In these circumstances, interlocutory review can 
be most effective and there is little reason to wait until after trial to review 
the matter, as waiting would result in significant cost and wasted effort. 
Motions based on actual bias, on the other hand, often point to the judge’s 
comments or rulings during the course of litigation. In such a case it may 
be useful to wait until the end of proceedings to review the entire record 
in determining the existence of bias or partiality. 
Furthermore, when it comes to motions based on the appearance of 
partiality, courts have also pointed to the difficulty of providing a full 
remedy on appeal. The D.C. Circuit recently concluded that “ordinary 
appellate review following a final judgment is ‘insufficient’ to cure ‘the 
existence of actual or apparent bias,” because “it is too difficult to detect 
all of the ways that [actual] bias can influence a proceeding.”71 Even 
reversing a judgment for “apparent bias . . . fails to restore public 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.”72 If disqualification 
based on appearance is meant to protect trust in the impartiality of the 
judicial system, then waiting until after final judgment to rectify the 
appearance of bias undercuts that goal. As a result, most federal courts 
have recognized that judicial disqualification questions cannot always 
wait until after final judgment.73 
70. See Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, Civil Case Processing
in the Federal District Courts: A 21st Century Analysis 38 (2009) (acknowledging that “about 35% 
of [civil] cases took more than one year to resolve, and the longest cases took ten years or more before 
a final resolution was reached.”). 
71. In re Mohammad, 866 F.3d 473, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d. 
71, 79 (2015)).  
72. Id. 
73. See, e.g., In re Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 
791 F.3d. at 79) (“[O]rdinary appellate review following a final judgment is insufficient to remove 
the insidious taint of judicial bias.”); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(joining “the clear consensus view” supporting interlocutory review “of a motion to disqualify based 
on conflict of interest and appearance of partiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455”); but see In re Cargill, Inc., 
66 F.3d 1256, 1264 n.10 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Just as orders disqualifying or refusing to disqualify counsel 
‘can be reviewed as effectively on appeal of a final judgment as on an interlocutory appeal,’ we see 
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B. Mandamus Review 
When appellate courts grant interlocutory review of the denial of a 
disqualification motion, they typically do so by accepting a petition for 
writ of mandamus under the authority of the All Writs Act.74 The standard 
of mandamus relief was traditionally very high, typically requiring a 
showing of a “usurpation of power” rather than “mere error.”75 In recent 
decades federal courts have showed a greater willingness to grant 
mandamus relief.76 Even under today’s more permissive environment, 
however, mandamus relief still requires a high threshold and is subject to 
the appellate court’s discretion.77 
In spite of the high showing required for mandamus relief generally, 
almost as soon as the federal code was amended to require disqualification 
based on appearance, some courts allowed for interlocutory review of the 
disqualification decision. A decade after the change, now-Judge (then-
Professor) Karen Nelson Moore reported that a majority of the circuits 
allowed mandamus review when trial judges refused to recuse themselves, 
while a minority (notably, the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits) held that 
mandamus was not available to review judicial disqualification.78 
Over time, the circuits have converged on agreement that mandamus 
is available to review the wrongful denial of a disqualification decision—
at least in certain cases. The Sixth Circuit, for example, refused to allow 
mandamus review of disqualification orders at all until 1990, and only 
then joined the other circuits in permitting at least the possibility of 
interlocutory review.79 
The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, did a complete about-face. In 1986, 
the circuit was listed as one of the remaining holdouts refusing 
interlocutory review in Judge Moore’s article. When it later reversed 
course and allowed mandamus review of disqualification motions based 
on the appearance of bias, it held for decades that mandamus was the only 
no reason why orders pertaining to judicial disqualification cannot be effectively reviewed at that time 
and in that manner.”) (quoting Richardson–Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 438 (1985)). 
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). 
75. Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595, 
599–600 (1973). 
76. Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 
288 (1993) (“In recent years, that standard has been relaxed.”). 
77. FED. R. APP. P. 21. 
78. Moore, supra note 6, at 839. 
79. See In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“To the
extent . . . that our prior case authority may be deemed to hold that we will not entertain or consider 
a petition for mandamus following refusal of a district court to disqualify . . . we now disavow such 
case precedent.”). 
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vehicle to challenge the denial of disqualification. The court did not 
permit parties who failed to file a mandamus petition to seek review of a 
disqualification decision after final judgment, holding that parties who 
failed to seek mandamus review forfeited their right to challenge the 
disqualification ruling.80 It was not until 2016 that the court overruled this 
long line of precedent and allowed a disqualification decision to be 
reviewed after final judgment.81 
By the late 2010s, the circuits were all in agreement that mandamus 
could offer a potential remedy—at least in certain circumstances—for the 
wrongful denial of appearance-based disqualification motions. This 
convergence in theory, however, did not necessarily create uniformity in 
practice. Even though mandamus relief has become more common over 
the last half-century, it is still considered a form of extraordinary relief 
subject to significant discretion. As a result, there remains substantial 
disagreement over mandamus use and procedure. 
The discretionary basis of mandamus—and its historical designation 
as “extraordinary” relief that should be only rarely invoked—means that 
it can be difficult to predict when mandamus relief will be available. 
Availability turns on norms and practice within each circuit, but there is 
significant variation among the circuits. The Second Circuit has been 
especially likely to grant mandamus review, writing that there are “few 
situations more appropriate for mandamus than a judge’s clearly wrongful 
refusal to disqualify himself.”82 The court concluded that interlocutory 
review was important, writing that “[a] claim of personal bias and 
prejudice strikes at the integrity of the judicial process, and it would be 
intolerable to hold that the disclaimer of prejudice by the very jurist who 
is accused of harboring it should itself terminate the inquiry until an 
ultimate appeal on the merits.”83 It should be noted, however, that while 
mandamus review is relatively easy to obtain in the Second Circuit, 
mandamus relief is significantly less so, and requires the petitioner to 
80. See In re City of Milwaukee, 788 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A mandamus petition is 
the proper way to challenge the denial of a recusal motion.”); U.S. v. Glavin, 580 F. App’x 482, 484 
(7th Cir. 2014) (“The denial of a motion for recusal under § 455(a) must be challenged immediately 
by a mandamus action, and Glavin’s failure to do so would prevent our review.”); Reed v. Lincare, 
Inc., 524 F. App’x 261, 262 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]o the extent that Reed’s recusal motion is construed 
as invoking 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), Reed waived any challenge to the district court’s denial of the motion 
by failing to file a petition for writ of mandamus.”). 
81. See Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016). 
82. In re Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1980). 
83. Id. at 926–27. 
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satisfy “the burden of establishing that its right is ‘clear and 
indisputable.’”84 
C. Discretionary Appeals and Collateral Orders 
Other vehicles beyond mandamus could offer alternate ways to 
provide interlocutory review of judicial disqualification orders.85 In 
theory, both discretionary appeals and collateral-order appeals offer 
alternatives to mandamus review. In practice, however, these mechanisms 
have lagged far behind mandamus as a potential review vehicle for 
judicial disqualification. 
1. Discretionary Appeals
District courts may certify discretionary interlocutory appeals.86 
Such discretionary appeals require the district judge to find that the order 
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” 
and to therefore certify the question to the appellate court.87 Once 
certified, the appellate court can choose to accept or deny interlocutory 
review.88 
Although commentators have recommended greater use of the 
provision, the federal courts have almost never found this standard to be 
satisfied in disqualification cases.89 Scholar Richard Flamm identifies two 
reasons for this difficulty. First, judicial disqualification motions—
especially those based on an appearance of partiality—rarely raise 
“controlling question[s] of law” of the type certification is intended to 
answer.90 After all, the crux of the decision is fundamentally a 
reasonableness determination. That is, given the facts and circumstances 
set out in the motion, is it reasonable to harbor doubts as to the judge’s 
ability to remain impartial? This analysis is necessarily a predominantly 
“fact-intensive” inquiry rather than a question of law. And even if the 
analysis of those facts carries within it a legal question, that legal question 
84. Id. at 927. 
85. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1294
(2007) (recommending the standardization of appellate procedures). 
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1037.
90. Id. at 1038. 
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is likely to bear at most a tangential relationship to the underlying merits 
of the case, and is therefore unlikely to be a “controlling” question.91 
A second and potentially higher hurdle is the judge’s initial 
evaluation. Section 455(a) requires judges to recuse when their 
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”92 As a result, a judge who 
denies such a motion is necessarily deciding that there is no reasonable 
basis on which to question his or her impartiality. Once that decision is 
made, there would be no basis for the judge to find that there is a 
“substantial ground for difference of opinion.”93 The judge’s denial of the 
motion logically “necessarily implies” that there is no such ground for a 
difference of opinion.94 Of course, a judge who thinks that the question is 
a close one may grant the motion to recuse and still certify the issue to the 
appellate court, as one federal judge did in a case involving a power 
company where the resolution of the action could potentially have led to 
a slight reduction of the judge’s utility bill.95 Similarly, another judge sua 
sponte recused himself but certified an appeal of that order after the local 
newspaper ran “a series of . . . articles that questioned his attitude toward 
class actions and attorneys’ fees awards.”96 
2. Cohen Collateral-Order Appeals
The collateral-order doctrine also offers a potential vehicle for 
appellate review, and it does not have the weaknesses of discretionary 
appeals under 1292(b). The collateral-order doctrine, often referred to as 
the Cohen collateral-order doctrine, is a common-law doctrine that allows 
appellate courts to hear appeals from rulings that “finally determine 
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause 
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole 
case is adjudicated.”97 
When the collateral-order doctrine applies, it makes it easier for the 
parties to seek appellate review. Because the underlying orders are 
91. See Solimine, The Renaissance of Permissive Interlocutory appeals and the Demise of the 
Collateral Order Doctrine, 53 AKRON L. REV. 607 (2020) (noting that courts “continue to tangle over 
the precise meaning” of these elements). 
92. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012). 
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). 
94. FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1038; Susan E. Barton, Note, Judicial Disqualification in the
Federal Courts: Maintaining an Appearance of Justice Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 863, 
883 (1978). 
95. In re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 360 (4th Cir. 1976). 
96. Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat’l. Bank, 627 F.2d 677, 679 (3d Cir. 1980). 
97. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
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“collateral” to the merits of the underlying case, the order itself is treated 
as final, and parties are allowed an appeal as of right—they need not seek 
judicial permission or rely on discretionary writs, and they need not wait 
until the resolution of the entire case. Furthermore, the collateral-order 
doctrine applies categorically. That is, “the operative inquiry is not 
whether the [particular ruling in question] is important, separable from the 
merits, and incapable of review after final judgment in a particular case—
rather, the question is whether these requirements can be met for an entire 
category of cases.”98 
In many ways, the Cohen collateral-order doctrine should be a 
perfect fit for appearance-based judicial disqualification. There is no 
doubt that the judge’s appearance of bias is collateral to the merits of the 
claim. By comparison, for example, discovery orders based on privilege 
claims are often intertwined with the merits of a case, especially when the 
privilege is less than absolute, and courts must balance the importance of 
the right at issue against a party’s need for the information.99 But no such 
balancing test occurs in judicial disqualification decisions, and the merits 
of the underlying suit should have no influence on the judge’s 
qualification to hear the case. 
The other prongs similarly fit well with judicial disqualification. 
Allowing the appellate court to review the ruling offers finality to the 
question of whether the judge is qualified to sit. And the appellate courts 
already seem to be persuaded by the importance of the issue and the 
difficulty of waiting to decide it until after final judgment, because all 
circuits have already held that disqualification motions can be heard by 
mandamus. 
So why have courts not applied the collateral-order doctrine to 
judicial disqualification motions? Scholars, including Judge Moore, have 
suggested that the collateral-order doctrine would be a good fit for judicial 
disqualification review.100 Court decisions denying collateral-order 
review are not compelling in their reasoning. For the most part, these 
decisions deny collateral-order review with a conclusory statement that 
the matter can be reviewed after final judgment.101 Of course, that 
conclusion conflicts with the fact that all circuits have agreed that the risk 
98. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 764 (2006).  
99. Id. 
100.  See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 861. 
 101.  In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 960–61 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(“Precisely because disqualification issues are reviewable following entry of judgment, as a threshold 
matter the Cohen doctrine is unavailing.”). 
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of harm in waiting to review the order supports interlocutory review by 
mandamus.102 The Second Circuit stated that the argument in favor of 
allowing collateral-order review “is not altogether unpersuasive,” but 
ultimately held that mandamus “is better adapted to prompt disposition of 
such claims.” The court therefore decided to “join other courts of appeals 
in holding that an order denying an application for disqualification of a 
judge is not a final decision appealable” as of right.103 
Another answer is the realist one suggested by Professor Solimine in 
this symposium—that the collateral-order doctrine, if not entirely defunct, 
is at least in the winding-down phase, where categories previously granted 
collateral-order status may continue to be heard, but no new categories 
can be added.104 The doctrine, after all, was developed as a common-law 
relief valve before the adoption of the discretionary-appeal statute. 
Certainly, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the 
collateral-order doctrine in recent decades, deferring instead to statutory 
and rulemaking processes to create new appellate pathways as needed.105 
Ten years ago, the Supreme Court refused to extend the Cohen collateral-
order doctrine to the appeal of attorney-client privilege claims, writing 
that “the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain ‘narrow and 
selective in its membership,’” an admonition that “has acquired special 
force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating 
rulemaking, ‘not expansion by court decision,’ as the preferred means for 
determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be 
immediately appealable.”106 The Court warned against allowing the 
collateral-order doctrine to “swallow the general rule that a party is 
entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been 
entered.”107 At the same time, however, the Court has also declined 
opportunities either to eliminate the doctrine altogether or to limit it to 
pre-existing categories. As Professor Solimine points out, the Court had a 
good opportunity to limit the doctrine in a recent case where the Fifth 
Circuit had applied the collateral-order doctrine to a discovery order that 
was challenged on First Amendment religious grounds.108 The Court’s 
decision not to hear the case may suggest that the collateral-order doctrine 
still has some continuing validity. Nevertheless, however good a fit the 
102.  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
103.  Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1966). 
104.  See Solimine, supra note 91. 
105.  Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009). 
106.  Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995)). 
107.  Id. at 106. 
108.  See Solimine, supra note 91 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Tex. Cath. Conf. of Bishops, 
139 S. Ct. 1170 (2019)). 
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doctrine may be, there has been no indication that courts are willing to 
expand the collateral-order doctrine to judicial disqualification rulings. 
IV. HARMONIZING STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
An appellate court’s review of a disqualification decision depends 
upon the appropriate standard. Differences between the circuits in the 
standard of review compounds the questions surrounding the appropriate 
vehicle for review. As a result, there is a notable lack of clarity as to the 
standard by which a disqualification decision will be evaluated. This lack 
of clarity extends to the degree of deference given to the district court, the 
power of the appellate court to review decisions granting as well as 
denying disqualification, the proper standard to apply when a party failed 
to seek disqualification in the trial court, and the relevance of a harmless-
error analysis. 
A. Abuse of Discretion or De Novo Review 
Most circuits apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing 
disqualification rulings based on an appearance of bias.109 Others, 
including the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, have at least sometimes 
applied de novo review—though not always consistently.110 In many 
cases, there is likely to be little difference between the two standards. The 
underlying rule is one of reasonableness, but reasonableness that is 
heavily weighted toward one side—that is, when would a reasonable 
observer have cause to doubt the judge’s impartiality in a given case? The 
underlying standard is not an ordinary question of law, as is typical in de 
novo review. Nor is it a question for which the trial judge can reasonably 
 109.  Pinkston v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs., 752 Fed. App’x. 756 (11th Cir. 2018); Akins v. 
Knight, 863 F.3d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 2017); Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 2014); Cox v. Onondaga Cty. Sheriff’s 
Dept., 760 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 110.  FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1107 (noting the Fourth Circuit generally applies de novo review 
to questions of judicial bias, though it applies an abuse of discretion standard to other bases for 
disqualification); in the Fourth Circuit, see also People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 
Va., 12 F.3d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1993) (“This court reviews questions of judicial bias de novo.”); in 
the Seventh Circuit, see In re Sherwin-Williams Co., 607 F.3d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Mandamus 
is the appropriate vehicle for a challenge to a district judge’s denial of a motion to recuse based on 
appearance of bias. Our review is de novo.”); but see Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702, 716 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“A district court judge’s decision not to recuse himself is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.”); in the Tenth Circuit, see Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162, 
1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting disqualification for an appearance of bias is “generally” reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion, but that when the trial judge does not “create a record or document her decision 
not to recuse,” then the court will apply a de novo standard). 
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exercise broad discretion, such as where the judge reviews the 
reasonableness of an attorney’s fee or the admissibility of evidence at trial. 
Instead of the judge acting within a range of conduct where any reasonable 
choice would be upheld, the reasonableness evaluation is all one sided—
if it is reasonable at all to question the judge’s impartiality, then the judge 
has no discretion. He or she is disqualified under § 455(a). 
Other scholars have pointed out the problematic applicability of the 
abuse-of-discretion standard. Professor Basset has written that “[i]n light 
of the existing anomaly requiring district judges to rule on motions 
involving their own partiality, and the undeniable importance of judicial 
impartiality to due process, the abuse of discretion standard accords too 
much deference to the trial judge’s determination.”111 Professors Freer 
and Cooper, writing in the latest edition of Federal Practice and 
Procedure, also expressed support for a de novo standard of review. They 
acknowledged that few courts have yet adopted the de novo standard, but 
concluded nonetheless that “[b]ecause the disqualification statutes are 
mandatory and reflect a societal interest in an impartial judiciary, there is 
a strong argument that appellate courts should apply a de novo standard 
in reviewing recusal decisions.”112 
The Supreme Court has not yet settled the question. It has, however, 
addressed an analogous situation that, though factually distinct, requires a 
similar type of analysis: that is, deciding when a police officer possessed 
a “reasonable suspicion” sufficient to support a traffic stop.113 In both 
types of cases, the court must review the reasonableness of an underlying 
position (that is, reasonable suspicion of illegal activity for the traffic stop, 
and reasonable questions about a judge’s impartiality for a recusal 
motion). And in both cases, once reasonableness is established, there is a 
single determination of power to act, rather than a range of actions that 
may be taken—reasonable suspicions means the traffic stop is allowable, 
and reasonable cause to question a judge’s impartiality prevents the judge 
from sitting. 
In Ornelas, the Supreme Court overruled earlier circuit precedent 
that applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to traffic stops.114 The Court 
noted that the underlying analysis is a mixture of law and fact: “[T]he 
historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, 
 111.  Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 1213, 1235 (2002). 
 112.  RICHARD D. FREER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 13D FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, § 3553 (Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller eds., 3d ed. 2008). 
113.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996). 
114.  Id. 
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and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or 
constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law 
as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”115 The Court noted 
that in reviewing trial-court determinations of reasonable suspicion, it had 
never deferred to the trial judge, but had instead provided “independent 
appellate review.”116 Such de novo review, the Court held, “tends to unify 
precedent” and offer guidance for future cases. The Court concluded that 
“[i]ndependent review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to 
maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles.”117 
The same principles apply with equal force when it comes to the 
review of judicial disqualification motions. Again, the legal standard is 
clearly established under § 455, and the underlying facts are rarely 
disputed. The only question is whether those facts give rise to a reasonable 
question about the judge’s impartiality. If they do, the judge must step 
aside—there is no room for the exercise of discretion within that process. 
Thus, deference to the judge’s decision making is unwarranted. The need 
for standardization, however, still remains—litigants need guidance as to 
which situations will reasonably give rise to an inference of partiality, and 
which will not. Independent appellate review under the de novo standard 
can offer that guidance. 
B. Post-Recusal Appellate Review 
In addition to questions about the appropriate standard of review, 
there is also disagreement among the federal courts about whether the trial 
judge’s grant of an appearance-based recusal motion can be reviewed on 
appeal. Most appeals, after all, deal with the judge’s denial of a motion. 
In the most common scenario, a party asserts that the circumstances raise 
a question as to the judge’s appearance of impartiality, and the judge 
denies the motion, leaving the appellate court to rule on whether the judge 
should continue with the case. Questions about a judge’s decision to 
recuse are rarer, perhaps in part because the judge may have alternate 
grounds to support the recusal—perhaps an admitted sense of partiality, a 
close relationship with a party or counsel, a financial interest, or a 
previous connection with the case. In such a case, disqualification may be 
so clearly required that no party raises a point of error. 
In other cases, however, judges may conclude that even though they 
do not believe themselves to be biased, the appearance of partiality is 
115.  Id. at 696–97 (quoting Pullman–Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)). 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
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strong enough to warrant their recusal. Freer and Cooper suggest that 
perhaps this decision should be unreviewable in its entirety, writing that 
“[a]s a matter of policy, there is a very strong argument that this decision 
should not be reviewable at any stage. After all, it is difficult to conclude 
that anyone is harmed by having a case proceed before a judge who is 
qualified to hear it.”118 They note that the Seventh Circuit has adopted this 
position.119 In Hampton v. City of Chicago, the court explicitly held that 
litigants have no protectable interest in having any particular judge decide 
their case. The court left open the possibility that the public interest might 
require standardization of recusal decisions, but found such a conclusion 
to be premature. The court wrote that if it would later “appear that 
unfounded recusals impede the administration of justice in the circuit, the 
circuit council would take appropriate action, but the interest being 
vindicated would be that of the public in the administration of justice, and 
not the interest of a particular litigant.”120 
Other courts, however, have been more lenient in allowing at least 
occasional review of such decisions.121 As noted above, in at least two 
cases out of the Third and Fourth Circuits, judges have granted an 
appearance-based motion, but at the same time certified the 
disqualification question to the appellate court under § 1292(b).122 The 
Ninth Circuit has agreed with the Seventh Circuit that review of a decision 
granting disqualification should not ordinarily be subject to appeal, but it 
suggested that mandamus relief may be available in the rare situation 
where the time to get a new judge up to speed on a case would “greatly 
disrupt” the proceedings.123 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has also reviewed 
at least one such case.124 
Although appeals of decisions granting disqualification are much 
rarer than appeals of decisions denying it, there is more merit to the 
appellate review of such decisions than the Seventh Circuit’s denial would 
suggest. It is true that in any one case litigants’ due process rights are fully 
118.  RICHARD D. FREER & EDWARD H. COOPER, supra note 112. 
119.  Id. (citing Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
120.  Hampton, 643 F.2d at 479. 
121.  CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 
104 (Fed. Jud. Center, 2d. ed. 2010). 
122.  See supra Part II.C.i. 
 123.  In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1981), cause 
dismissed sub nom. Ariz. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 459 U.S. 961 (1982), and aff’d sub 
nom. Ariz. v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983) (“Ultimately, if dissatisfied with the 
district judge’s decision and confident that the litigation will be greatly disrupted, a party may seek a 
writ of mandamus from the court of appeals.”). 
124.  Kelley v. Metro. Cty. Bd. of Ed. of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 479 F.2d 810, 811 
n.1 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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vindicated by trial before any qualified judge. But as the Supreme Court 
has noted, one of the major benefits of the appellate process is to clarify 
and standardize the law.125 This feature of appellate law is subverted, 
however, if appellate courts can review only cases where disqualification 
is denied. Such a limitation would cause a systematic distortion, as 
appellate courts could push back against outlier decisions wrongfully 
denying disqualification, but would be forced to leave outlier decisions 
granting disqualification untouched.126 The effect of such one-sided 
appellate review would be to push the law too far toward recusal, as judges 
would be inclined in close cases to err on the side of recusal, knowing that 
the decision could not be overturned. Over time, the weight of such 
incentives could very well inadvertently shift the window of perceived 
reasonableness. 
Such a systemic change, if it were to occur, could ultimately threaten 
due process. The primary purpose of appearance-based judicial review, 
after all, is not to protect the interests of individual litigants—if that were 
the only interest, the appellate court could safely ignore questions of bias 
in favor of simply addressing the merits of the case as necessary to ensure 
that the case’s ultimate outcome comported with the law. Instead, 
however, appearance-based disqualification is intended to protect the trust 
that the larger population places in the judiciary. 
That trust, in turn, requires that judges deny disqualification motions 
based on unreasonable suspicions and unfounded allegations. Thus, courts 
have held that “where the standards governing disqualification have not 
been met, disqualification is not optional; rather, it is prohibited,” and “[a] 
judge is as much obliged not to recuse himself when it is not called for as 
he is obliged to when it is.”127 Courts have acknowledged that rumor and 
speculation can cause the public to distrust a judge’s impartiality—but 
giving in to unfounded charges “would allow an irresponsible, vindictive 
or self-interested press informant and/or an irresponsible, misinformed or 
careless reporter to control the choice of judge.”128 
125.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996). 
 126.  See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 213 (2008) 
(explaining how one-sided appellate review also creates “systemic bias” in circuits that refuse to 
review decisions granting new trials). 
127.  In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 
939 (10th Cir. 1987) (“There is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion 
for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.”). 
 128.  In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 
42, 46 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Section 455(a) modified, but did not eliminate, the duty to sit doctrine. 
The duty to sit doctrine originally not only required a judge to sit in the absence of any reason to 
recuse, but also required a judge to resolve close cases in favor of sitting rather than recusing. Section 
455(a) eliminated the latter element of the doctrine, but not the former.”) (citations omitted). But see 
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Thus, appellate courts have an important role to play both in ensuring 
that judges step aside when reasonable appearances require it, as well as 
ensuring that judges retain jurisdiction over cases in the face of unfounded 
rumor, speculation, or spurious allegation. Review of decisions granting 
disqualification probably do differ in one important way from the review 
of decisions denying it, however. When a judge refuses to disqualify, as 
noted above, courts will often grant interlocutory review—but they will 
also allow review after final judgment in cases where the parties did not 
seek interlocutory review. And while interlocutory review may be 
preferable to avoid wasted time and effort, review after final judgment 
still protects against a statutorily or even constitutionally disqualified 
judge from proceeding with the case. 
When a judge grants a recusal order, however, that decision should 
likely be reviewed only through interlocutory review. After final 
judgment, the equities are different—by this point, another judge would 
have put substantial time into the case. And unlike the situation where the 
judge refused to recuse, in this case the judge who put the time and effort 
into the case is neither statutorily nor constitutionally disqualified. The 
cost to the court and parties of rehearing the case is likely too high to 
warrant post-judgment review. 
C. Raising the Appearance of Bias for the First Time on Appeal 
In some cases, parties raise the appearance of bias only on appeal, 
having failed to move for disqualification in the trial court. This happens 
only after final judgment; interlocutory review, by contrast, could only be 
available when the trial court had first made a ruling. After final judgment, 
however, it is not uncommon for an appellate court to be faced with an 
appeal from a party that failed to seek disqualification of the trial judge 
and failed “even to alert that court as to the existence of its concerns.”129 
Ordinarily, a party who fails to raise a point of error in the trial court 
forfeits that claim on appeal. The Sixth Circuit has followed that rule for 
judicial disqualification, concluding that the failure to raise the issue in 
the court below precludes appellate review.130 The majority of the other 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. 
L. REV. 813, 958 (2009) (“The duty to sit is an outdated, problematic doctrine unhelpful to twenty-
first century questions of disqualification. . . . The ABA, the states, the judiciary and the legal 
profession should affirmatively declare that close questions be decided in favor of recusal.”). 
129.  FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1125. 
 130.  Id.; Grider Drugs, LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc., 500 F. App’x 402, 406 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“Recusal arguments such as this one, based on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which are not brought before the 
district court, are deemed waived.”); Cook v. Cleveland State Univ., 13 F. App’x 320, 322 (6th Cir. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/3
2019] JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION ON APPEAL 599 
circuits, however, have concluded that “claims about a judge’s 
qualifications of impartiality” must receive at least some attention on 
appeal in order to ensure fundamental fairness.131 Thus, for example, the 
Eighth Circuit has held that “[o]rdinarily, we review a judge’s refusal to 
recuse for an abuse of discretion. However, when a recusal claim is not 
raised below, we apply a lower standard of appellate review and review 
only for plain error.”132 Other courts have similarly stated that they would 
“search the record for ‘clear,’ ‘manifest,’ ‘obvious,’ ‘palpable,’ or ‘plain,’ 
error.”133 
The circuits applying the “plain error” standard in disqualification 
cases haven’t explained the basis for it. The standard was “developed in 
federal criminal cases and was eventually codified in Criminal Rule 
52(b),”134 which provides that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court.”135 Although the text of the rule itself requires only 
that the error be “plain” and affect “substantial rights,” the federal courts 
have interpreted the standard quite restrictively, so that in “most cases this 
means that the error must have been prejudicial and it must have affected 
the outcome of the district court proceedings.”136 Additionally, in criminal 
cases the Supreme Court has stated that “plain” error “is synonymous with 
‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious’ error.”137 The federal circuit courts have 
not consistently decided whether (or to what extent) the “plain error” 
standard should apply in civil litigation.138 Nor is it obvious whether a 
civil “plain error” standard would be interpreted the same way as the 
criminal standard. 
2001) (“Th[e] general rule bars an appellate court from considering a recusal issue that was not 
initially raised in the trial court.”). 
 131.  FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1125; United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1276 (10th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Arache, 946 F.2d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 1991); Osei-Afriyie by Osei-Afriyie v. 
Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 886 (3d Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 
968 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 132.  Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citations 
omitted). 
133.  FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1126 (citing cases from a variety of state and federal jurisdictions).  
 134.  KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 21 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 5043 
(Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller eds., 2d ed., August 2019 Update). 
135.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
136.  PETER J. HENNING, THE PLAIN ERROR RULE, 3B FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
CRIMINAL § 856 (Charles A. Wright & Peter J. Henning) (4th ed.). 
137.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 
 138.  GRAHAM, supra note 134 (“Though the Civil Rules lack an equivalent provision, some 
opinions suggest the doctrine can be invoked in civil cases as well.”) (citing ML Healthcare Servs., 
LLC v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 881 F.3d 1293, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2018)). 
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These differences may not be relevant to disqualification cases, 
however; instead, the standard applied to judicial disqualification may 
have a different basis entirely. The Seventh Circuit, after examining this 
conflicting precedent from other jurisdictions, concluded that the statute 
itself precluded a finding of forfeiture.139 It noted that § 455(e) allows 
parties to waive the appearance of bias under § 455(a), but only after the 
judge makes a “full disclosure on the record” and the litigant affirmatively 
waives disqualification.140 The court also noted that the Supreme Court 
had twice “allowed litigants to seek disqualification despite the absence 
of a protest in the court where the disqualified judge sat.”141 The court 
therefore held that failure to raise the disqualification issue would not 
preclude a later assignment of error on appeal. The court did not, however, 
specify whether a different standard of review would apply when the party 
failed to challenge the ruling below, or whether a “plain error” standard 
should generally apply to § 455(a) cases. 
It is understandable why appellate courts would want to try to walk 
an intermediate path with the standard of appeal, and the “plain error” 
standard, familiar in criminal cases, may be attractive to judges. The 
appellate courts want to avoid upholding clear cases of judicial 
disqualification and to preserve both the appearance and the reality of 
impartiality on the bench. At the same time, the appellate courts also do 
not want to create incentives for parties to delay raising questions of 
apparent bias—and especially do not want parties to be able to wait and 
see if they win at trial and raise questions of bias only if they lose.142 These 
are the same policy considerations that led to the development of Rule 
52(b) in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.143 
But this intermediate standard may sound better in theory than it 
works in practice. When it comes to the appearance of bias, it is not clear 
that there is a significant difference between “plain error,” and either “de 
novo” or “abuse of discretion” review. In appearance-based 
disqualification cases, there is rarely a dispute over the facts. Instead, the 
dispute is about how a reasonable observer would view those facts. With 
no factual question in the mix, that analysis will look similar under any of 
the standards of review. 
139.  Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2016). 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. (citing Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) and Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 
S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016)). 
 142.  FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1126 (noting that even though review is preserved under the 
majority rule, “[t]his does not mean, however, that a party who fails to preserve its objection to a 
lower court’s qualifications pays no price.”). 
143.  See supra note 135. 
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A more fruitful approach might be to apply the constitutional 
standard for disqualification when a party fails to raise a statutory claim 
at trial. This is the approach that the Supreme Court takes when reviewing 
state-court disqualification issues, after all, and it represents the “outer 
boundaries of judicial disqualification” rather than the more protective 
measures authorized by legislation or court rule.144 Once the state supreme 
courts have found disqualification to be unnecessary under state law, the 
only question for the Supreme Court to resolve is whether constitutional 
due process requires something more. Thus, the Court concluded in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,145 that a party’s multi-million-dollar 
campaign support created “significant and disproportionate influence” 
requiring disqualification. Likewise, in Williams v. Pennsylvania, the 
Court held that a judge’s earlier participation in the case as a prosecutor 
required disqualification as a matter of constitutional due process.146 
Applying the constitutional standard would allow the appellate 
courts to ensure that due process safeguards are satisfied while still 
discouraging neglect or delay in disqualification proceedings. Under the 
constitutional standard, courts would not have to apply the statutory 
formulation that requires disqualification whenever a judge’s impartiality 
“might reasonably be questioned.”147 Instead, the court would apply a 
narrower standard, requiring disqualification only when the situation 
“g[ives] rise to an unacceptable risk of actual bias.”148 
It is possible that the plain-error standard now applied by appellate 
courts is already intended to mirror the constitutional standard.149 If so, 
the appellate courts should offer greater clarification. After all, even the 
most “plain” or “obvious” appearance problem does not necessarily create 
a higher risk of actual bias. Likewise, the divergence of practice between 
circuits does not suggest the recognition of an underlying constitutional 
standard—in particular, the Sixth Circuit’s finding of waiver or forfeiture 
by failure to raise disqualification in the trial court is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s procedural protection of due process rights.150 
144.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009). 
145.  Id.  
146.  Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016). 
147.  28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012). 
148.  Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908. 
149.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (setting forth the plain error test, the 
third prong of which is that the purported error must “affect[] substantial rights”); see also HENNING, 
supra note 136 (“[T]he cases have given the distinct impression that ‘plain error’ is a concept appellate 
courts have found impossible to define, save that they know it when they see it.”). 
 150.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“It has been pointed out that ‘courts indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do 
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’”). 
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Interpreting such forfeiture to extend only to the statutory grounds, but 
not to constitutional ones, would better align with Supreme Court 
precedent and would offer greater consistency in disqualification cases. 
D. Harmless Error 
An appellate court’s determination that the trial court judge erred is 
often not the end of the analysis.151 In most contexts an appellate court 
will proceed to analyze whether the error was “harmless.”152 The doctrine 
of harmless error is similar to the doctrine of plain error—in fact, both are 
codified in Rule 52 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.153 Both focus on 
the substantial rights of the defendant. But where “plain error” applies to 
matters that a defendant failed to raise at trial, “harmless error” applies 
when the defendant did raise the issue, but nonetheless the trial judge’s 
erroneous ruling did “not affect substantial rights” and therefore “must be 
disregarded.”154 Unlike plain error, harmless error has been solidly 
integrated into civil practice as well as criminal.155 
But even though harmless error is common in both civil and criminal 
litigation, the degree to which circuit courts of appeals should apply the 
doctrine of “harmless error” to disqualification motions (and particularly 
to violations of § 455(a)) is not completely settled.156 When a reviewing 
court concludes that a trial judge should have stood recused but 
erroneously refused or failed to do so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
After all, trial court judges generally enjoy broad discretion in conducting 
trials,157 as evidenced by the exceedingly permissive “abuse of discretion” 
 151.  See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
district court erred in admitting documentary evidence, but affirming the defendant’s conviction 
because the error was harmless); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1069–71 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(holding that although the defendant was erroneously denied his right to counsel on his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the error was harmless). 
 152.  Harmless error is “[a] trial-court error that does not affect a party’s substantive rights or 
the case’s outcome.” Harmless Error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Thus, an appellate 
finding of harmless error generally forecloses reversal, remand, or other remedies that would “reopen” 
litigation after a final judgment. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 61; FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 52(a). 
153.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. 
154.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
155.  FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors 
and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”). 
 156.  This section limits consideration to appeals of the recusal question after final judgment, as 
the interlocutory mandamus or collateral-order context would not reach “harmless error.” When an 
appellate court considers the recusal question before a final judgment is issued, harmless error review 
would be by definition inapplicable as the case has not reached an “outcome.”  
 157.  See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from 
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971). 
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standard of appellate review.158 With broad discretion as the rule rather 
than the exception for many decisions made in the midst of a trial, can a 
§ 455 violation truly be “harmless?”159
Courts’ applications of the harmless-error doctrine in the recusal 
context need clarification because of the considerable confusion that has 
arisen under existing precedent. The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta 
that the doctrine of harmless error may apply in some disqualification 
cases, writing that “[a]s in other areas of the law, there is surely room for 
harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a 
disqualifying circumstance. There need not be a draconian remedy for 
every violation of § 455(a).”160 The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has 
declined to apply the doctrine, concluding that “[b]ecause of the 
fundamental need for judicial neutrality, we hold that the harmless error 
doctrine is inapplicable in cases where judicial bias and/or hostility is 
found to have been exhibited at any stage of a judicial proceeding.”161 
The best approach may be to abandon the “harmless error” 
nomenclature and instead honestly and forthrightly affirm a judgment 
notwithstanding the defect when the balance of the equities requires not 
opening closed litigation. This may be the preferred approach for two 
reasons. First, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Liljeberg162 has led to 
confused application of “harmless error” in recusal review. While courts 
typically call it a “harmless error” analysis, their application of Supreme 
Court precedent when crafting a remedy looks like a separate remedial 
test. And second, calling the error “harmless” discounts the effect that trial 
in front of an erroneously unrecused judge has on public confidence in the 
judicial system.163 
 158.  Circuit courts’ recitations of the standard are illustrative. E.g., Young v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2012) (“An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court relies 
on clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal 
standard when reaching a conclusion, or makes a clear error of judgment.”); Int’l Jensen, Inc. v. 
Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993) (“An abuse of discretion is a plain error, 
discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic 
and effect of the facts as are found.”) (quotation omitted). 
 159.  This section does not analyze in depth harmless error when judicial failures to recuse rise 
to the level of constitutional violations, as the Supreme Court has proscribed finding harmless error 
in this context. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016) (“[A]n unconstitutional failure 
to recuse constitutes structural error even if the judge in question did not cast a deciding vote.”). 
160.  Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988). 
161.  Anderson v. Sheppard, 856 F.2d 741, 746–747 (6th Cir. 1988). 
162.  Liljeberg, 486 U.S. 847. 
163.  See, e.g., Christopher Brett Jaeger & Jennifer S. Trueblood, Thinking Quantum: A New 
Perspective on Decisionmaking in Law, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 733, 784 (2019) (arguing that appellate 
courts likely over-apply the doctrine of harmless error, in part because it can be hard to know what 
result the trial court would have reached in the absence of error). 
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In the Supreme Court’s “first significant interpretation”164 of 
§ 455(a), the Court concluded that the district court judge violated the
statute by failing to recuse and then proceeded to analyze whether this 
error required vacatur.165 When considering the appropriate remedy for a 
§ 455 violation, particularly when the underlying litigation was final and
the case was before the Court on a motion to vacate judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)166 rather than on direct appeal, 
the Court left open the door for harmless error in the recusal context.167 
With the Supreme Court seemingly allowing for a harmless-error 
remedial analysis, courts have treated Liljeberg as creating a new 
balancing test in the § 455 context, leading to confusion when courts call 
this a “harmless error” analysis. Liljeberg presents three factors to 
consider when crafting a remedy: 
[I]n determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation 
of § 455 (a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties 
in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce 
injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s 
confidence in the judicial process.168 
The Liljeberg test may strike the appropriate balance, but this 
balancing test is different in kind from normal “results-based” harmless 
error contexts, which focus on the effect of the error on the result reached 
at trial.169 Courts have applied the Liljeberg factors while calling the 
analysis a “harmless error” review.170 But unlike “results-based” harmless 
error tests that focus on the impact of the error on the result of the trial, 
 164.  Kenneth M. Fall, Note, Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.: The Supreme Court 
Encourages Disqualification of Federal Judges Under Section 455(a), 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1035 
(1989).  
165.  See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 861–870. 
 166.  Rule 60(b)(6) allows a litigant to move for relief from judgment for “any other reason that 
justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
167.  Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862. 
168.  Id. at 864.  
169.  See Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1791, 1823 (2017). See also Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate 
Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1336–40 (1994) (noting 
“uncertainty” in how courts test for harmless error, and that there “at least three” different 
approaches). Despite the numerous approaches, each typically focuses on the impact at the trial below. 
See id. 
 170.  Compare United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 777 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying the Liljeberg 
balancing factors on direct appeal when crafting a remedy and noting the inquiry is not a “traditional 
harmless-error analysis”), with In re Continental Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259, 1263 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(stating “the ‘harmless error’ rule applies to a breach of a judge’s duty to stand recused” but then 
reciting and applying the Liljeberg factors), and Williamson v. Ind. Univ., 345 F.3d 459, 464 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
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Liljeberg’s second and third factors expressly direct a reviewing court to 
consider the extrinsic effects of the failure to recuse—and appropriately 
so. After all, § 455 seeks to promote public confidence in the judiciary;171 
ignoring the extrinsic effects of a violation cuts against the purpose of the 
law. Appropriateness notwithstanding, this test is still not a typical 
“harmless error” analysis. 
One possible reason for this persistence in nomenclature may be that 
appellate courts are familiar with the concept of harmless error, when a 
defect in the proceedings below cannot be ignored yet could not have 
affected the outcome of the case.172 But regardless of the reason, calling a 
district court judge’s failure to stand recused “harmless error” ignores the 
fundamental concern that “justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice.”173 At this stage in the § 455 analysis, the appellate court must 
have necessarily concluded that the district court judge’s “impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned”174 or that the judge was statutorily 
disqualified per § 455(b). Because § 455 aims to protect public confidence 
in judicial proceedings, the argument is strong that a judge whose 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned can never “harmlessly” 
adjudicate a dispute—especially considering the broad discretion judges 
retain in conducting trials. Because the judge’s impartiality could be 
questioned, public confidence in judicial proceedings will necessarily be 
harmed in such a case. 
That is not to say that reversal or remand should be mandatory in all 
instances.175 As previously noted, reopening and relitigating closed cases 
is costly to parties as well as courts. This is especially so in cases, for 
example, where there are many parties, the judge’s conflict of interest is 
extremely minor, or litigation has spanned multiple years.176 Indeed, the 
Liljeberg balancing test may even strike the proper balance by directing 
appellate courts to consider the extrinsic effects of a judge’s failure to 
stand recused on the entire judicial system and future litigants. But courts 
should not confuse this for a typical “harmless error” analysis and should 
171.  See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860. 
 172.  See Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal 
Error be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1168–70 (1995). 
173.  Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
174.  28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012). 
175.  There is a forceful argument that “harmless-error” doctrine in recusal law, no matter what 
the nomenclature, should be discarded in its entirety in criminal trials. When a judge violates § 455 
and thus the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, it is hard to imagine the failure to 
recuse did not affect the criminal defendant’s substantial rights.  
 176.  See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862 n.9 (raising the issue of “[l]arge, multidistrict class actions” 
with “hundreds or even thousands” of parties). 
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accordingly abandon the nomenclature. A more appropriate approach 
would be for a court to forthrightly affirm the final judgment (or deny a 
motion for relief from judgment) notwithstanding the district court 
judge’s failure to stand recused. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Adjudication by an impartial decision maker is one of the most 
fundamental cornerstones of due process. The interest is so essential that 
constitutional due process guards against even the appearance of partiality 
in judicial actions.177 But how can the judiciary ensure the appearance of 
impartiality—especially in an era of ever-increasing polarization of 
opinion? 
Under our modern litigation system, appellate courts play an 
important role both in correcting error and in standardizing the application 
of law to ensure that justice is applied fairly. In order to play those roles 
effectively when litigants raise a judicial disqualification challenge, the 
appellate courts should standardize their own procedures for handling the 
review of disqualification claims. Regularly accepting review of judicial 
disqualification motions—both on an interlocutory basis and after final 
judgment—and harmonizing the standards of review on appeal would 
offer greater clarity about the standards for recusal and would thus 
heighten the public’s trust in the judiciary. 
 177.  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (“The Due Process Clause ‘may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no 
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending 
parties. But to perform its high function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice.’”). 
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